



Risk Analysis in Single Source Defence
Acquisition Programmes

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Assuring value, building confidence





### Today I will cover:

- The SSRO's aims
- The history to SSRO's formation
- The role and remit of the SSRO
- The data we collect
- What we do with this data
- Perspectives on the regime
- Benefits of the regime
- Lessons learned from 2 years of the regime







## The SSRO is the expert guardian and adjudicator of the single source procurement framework

- Independent regulator of the UK government's procurement of 'single source' military equipment and services.
- Our principle statutory aims are that:
- Good value for money is obtained in government expenditure on qualifying defence contracts.
- 2. Persons who are parties to qualifying defence contracts are paid a fair and reasonable price under those contracts.








# Spend on non-competitive contracts is £8.8bn, £3.1 bn placed in new non-competitive contracts in 2015/16


Direct MOD payments paid through competitive and non-competitive contracts in 2015/16







## The SSRO was formed following Lord Currie's 'Review into single-source military equipment contracts'







#### The SSRO: what we do

#### **SSRO**

#### Independent regulator and custodian

- \* Review of Act and Regulations
- \* Statutory guidance
- \* Assessment of profit rates
- \* Compliance monitoring
- \* Maintaining database and analysing data
- Delivery of additional services by agreement

#### Coverage

- Scheme applies to qualifying defence contracts (QDCs)
- Qualifying sub-contracts (QSCs) are also covered, following assessment and notification

#### Price control

- Price is controlled by a formula: price = AC + (CPR x AC)
- Costs must be allowable costs (AC)
- Contract profit rate (CPR) determined by a six-step process

#### Transparency

- Suppliers keep accounting records for audit purposes
- Suppliers submit reports on contracts, overheads and forward planning
- SSRO analyses reported data

#### Referrals

- Issues resolved by the SSRO on referral
- \* Opinions
- \* Determinations

#### **Enforcement**

- \* MOD responsible for enforcement
- \* Compliance notices
- \* Penalty notices





## The Single Source Contract Regulations 2014 apply to the following contracts


- All single source contracts worth £5 million or more
- All single source sub-contracts worth £25 million or more
- Some single source contracts are automatically excluded:
  - agreements with a foreign government
  - contracts for the acquisition or management of land or buildings
  - activities relating to intelligence matters
- SofS can exceptionally exempt a particular contract
- It can apply to existing contracts on amendment, but only where both parties consent, and this triggers a re-price





## The SSRO each year recommends the Baseline Profit Rate, and adjustments, paid to industry

- The SSRO annually reviews the baseline profit rate, which must be used when calculating the contract profit rate of QDCs
- The SSRO makes a recommendation to the Secretary of State for Defence on whether the rate should be changed
- Current rate: 8.95 per cent
- The SSRO is developing multiple profit rates for 2017/18




\* Not applicable until 2017





## All costs claimed must be 'Allowable' – following our guidance on *Allowable Costs*



- A legal requirement to have regard to guidance in determining whether costs are *Allowable* under a qualifying defence contract and qualifying subcontract
- Principles, rather than rules, based





#### Costs incurred in a contract must be Allowable

- Allowable Costs are those incurred in a contract that are billed to the customer - they are the key driver of the contract price
- Costs incurred in a contract must be 'appropriate, attributable, and reasonable in the circumstances'
- Our guidance ensures the customer only pays costs that are in direct relation to the contract
- Examples of non-Allowable Costs we have seen include: marketing and sales costs; faulty workmanship; and entertainment

- Rework
- Sunk costs
- Insurances
- Impairment of goodwill and amortisation
- Risk
- Employee benefits

Examples of Allowable and non-Allowable Costs

- Faulty workmanship
- Contingency funding
- Sales and marketing costs
- Civil penalties and fines
- Entertainment
- Capital costs





## The SSRO analyses QDC data, and from its analysis produces reports and reviews its guidance



Analysis includes:

- Supplier portfolio analysis
- Defence benchmarks and parametrics
- Annual Compliance Report
- Other analysis as requested by the Secretary of State for Defence





### One way we look to use our data is through publication of statistical bulletins

The statistical bulletins have focused on:

- Profit rates
- Planned contract duration
- Contract pricing methods
- Capital Servicing adjustments
- International aspects of QDCs

Check gov.uk/ssro for updates







## We have published a report drawing together views on single source procurement – as it was, is, and might be

Perspectives on non-competitive defence spending invited views from academics, defence experts, accountants and former members of the military.

The report found that single source procurement can deliver savings if:


- the objectives are clear
- contracts are managed in the right way
- the right culture exists between the customer and supplier







The framework provides for pricing risk in contracts, and there are a number of ways this is done



No control of risk

SSRO Guidance






How can this area be managed? Partially controllable?





Benefits from the single source procurement regime







### Granularity of data, and knowing which bits are important

With data analysis, you should look at what's important, rather than the largest spend



- 1. Engine
- 2. Gearbox



- 1. Gearbox
- 2. Engine

Focus on the data that will make the customer smarter





### Lessons learned from 2 years of the single source regime...

mber of QDCs is low

20% of contracts subject to had to taxpayer, MOD and the regime industry

inancial savings to be DD identify savings so favor access to more contract made £53 million data the savings can increase

ompiling new data

Contract data that has never benchmarking and making before been collected MOD a better buyer





### Any questions?











